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REQUIRING THE UNKNOWN OR PRESERVING REASON:
UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-HUERTA AND THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S COMPROMISE APPROACH TO BOOKER ERROR
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Bookert sent shockwaves throughout both the criminal justice commu-
nity and society at large. The method for sentencing all federal offenders
had been struck down as a violation of the constitutionally protected
right to a jury trial, and the Court changed the previously mandatory sen-
tencing structure into an advisory guideline.2 The Court provided that
"normal prudential doctrines" should guide the review of the now uncon-
stitutional sentences, but unfortunately that guidance was not sufficient.3
Left with the overwhelming task of reviewing the constitutionality
of each pending sentence and guided by the ambiguous and scantly de-
scribed "plain error doctrine," a significant disparity developed in the
approaches that various federal appellate courts employed. Some circuits
utilized a hard line approach to resentencing, buoyed by the textual read-
ing of plain error precedent.4 Others were more lenient and addressed
the fundamental fairness issues by remanding cases for the sole purpose
of determining if the district court would have imposed a different sen-
tence under the post-Booker structure.5 Yet even other circuits gave full
deference to the rights of defendants by presuming the mere application
of mandatory sentencing guidelines constituted prejudice.6 The several
different approaches resulted in only one clear rule-that defendants
were being treated differently based solely on geography-a situation the
original Sentencing Reform Act was expressly designed to defeat.7
Within this context, the Tenth Circuit added yet another layer to the
methods of applying Booker with its decision in United States v. Gon-
1. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). For further discussion of Booker in this issue, see Michael W.
McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 665 (2006).
2. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 752.
3. ld. at 769.
4. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct.
3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (1lth Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1148).
5. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino,
401 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (U.S., Oct. 3,
2005) (No. 04-10402); United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
6. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barnett,
398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-1690).
7. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
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zalez-Huerta.8 The Tenth Circuit found that the fourth prong of plain
error review, rather than the third prong that most other circuits were
relying upon, was the proper basis for refusing to remand a sentence
based solely on prior convictions and facts admitted by the defendant. 9
Although seemingly falling in line with the other hard line circuits, such
as the First, Fifth, and Eleventh, this article perceives the Tenth Circuit's
decision as a distinct and more appropriate determination resulting from
the Supreme Court's guidance in Booker that not every sentence deserves
remand. 10
This article will analyze the Gonzalez-Huerta decision within the
context of both the sister Circuits' decisions and the brief history of the
plain error review doctrine. Part I will discuss the history of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, including the legal challenges to the mandatory
sentencing regime, and the development of the plain error doctrine. Part
II will discuss the Tenth Circuit's decision in Gonzalez-Huerta and com-
pare the decisions of the other circuits. In Part III, this article agrees with
the ultimate outcome of the Gonzalez-Huerta decision and the analysis of
the fourth element of plain error review. However, the Tenth Circuit's
decision to place the burden on the defendant to satisfy the third element
of plain error review is a mistake given fairness considerations and the
difficulty of establishing prejudice in post-Booker sentence challenges.
Finally, this article will conclude that the Gonzalez-Huerta decision
represents the clearest application of the Supreme Court's intent under
both Booker and the plain error doctrine precedent.
I. BACKGROUND
A. United States Federal Sentencing Guidelines
1. History
Since the founding of the United States of America, federal judges
have been given unfettered discretion when determining an offender's
sentence after a conviction, with the power to impose anything between
parole and the statutory maximum."' Judges' expansive power over sen-
tencing was moderately curtailed by the establishment of a parole com-
mission, which arose in response to a shift towards the rehabilitative
model of criminal punishment.' 2 Although judges still imposed the sen-
tences, the parole commission determined the actual time served through
8. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
9. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 739.
10. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
11. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, AN OVERVIEW OF THE UNITED STATES
SENTENCING COMMISSION 1 (2005), http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSCoverview.2005.pdf [here-
inafter USSC OVERVIEW].
12. Kate Stith & Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 225-28 (1993).
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the discretion to release convicted offenders prior to the expiration of
their sentences. t 3  After an offender had served one-third of his sen-
tence, 14 the parole commission could release the offender upon a finding
that the welfare of society would not be threatened and the offender
would not reviolate the laws. 15  Outside of the creation of the parole
commission, federal judges' sentencing power remained largely un-
checked until the Reagan era.'
6
Extensive criticism was directed at the indiscriminate sentencing
system during the early 1970's. The most persuasive voices in favor of
binding sentencing guidelines were those of Judge Marvin E. Franke1
7
and Senator Edward M. Kennedy. 18 Surprisingly, the main support for
sentencing guidelines originated from liberals who viewed them as anti-
imprisonment and anti-discrimination measures.' 9 Debate over sentenc-
ing guidelines lasted over a decade, and Congress finally responded by
abolishing the indeterminate sentencing structure and passing the Sen-
tencing Reform Act within provisions of the Comprehensive Crime Con-
trol Act of 1984.21 The main goals of the Sentencing Reform Act were to
increase the consistency of sentencing and incorporate the four main
purposes of criminal punishment (i.e., retribution, deterrence, incapacita-
tion, and rehabilitation).22 The structure that replaced indeterminate sen-
tencing was a set of Sentencing Guidelines established by an administra-
tive agency within the judiciary called the United States Sentencing
Commission ("Sentencing Commission").23  The Sentencing Commis-
sion developed the Federal Sentencing Guidelines ("Sentencing Guide-
lines"), which were to provide certainty in sentencing and acceptance of
the four purposes of criminal justice.24 The Sentencing Guidelines went
into effect on November 1, 1987,25 and provided a mandatory range for
13. Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 387, 36 Stat. 819, 819 (1910) (subsequently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1982) (repealed 1984)) (establishing parole commissions at each of the three
existing federal penitentiary systems).
14. Id.
15. Id at 819-20.
16. See Stith & Koh, supra note 12, at 223.
17. Id. at 228-30 (noting that Frankel's book, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order, earned
him the title of "father of sentencing reform").
18. Id. at 230-36 (noting that Senator Kennedy's main interest was the passage of a bill that
overhauled all federal criminal statutes, but that Kennedy spearheaded a bipartisan movement for
sentencing guidelines).
19. Id. at 223, 232-33 (discussing the participation of Senator John L. McClellan and Profes-
sor Alan Dershowitz in garnering support for the sentencing guidelines).
20. Id. at 223, 225, 228-30.
21. Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (codified as amended
at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551 to 3559, 3561 to 3566, 3571 to 3574, 3581 to 3586, & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991 to 998
(1988)).
22. USSC OVERVIEW, supra note 11, at 1. See also Stith & Koh, supra note 12, at 239-43.
23. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (2005) (creating a seven-member commission within the judiciary for the
purpose of establishing sentencing policies and practices).
24. Id.
25. USSC OVERVIEW, supra note 11, at 2.
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sentencing.2 6 The Sentencing Reform Act included a list of factors which
could be considered for increasing or decreasing a sentence.2 7 Any de-
viation from the prescribed range required the judge to detail the specific
reasons for the departure.28
2. Challenges
The Sentencing Guidelines elicited strident reactions from both lib-
eral and conservatives that soon led to legal challenges of the Sentencing
Reform Act. Within two years of enactment of the Sentencing Guide-
lines in 1987, the formation and duties of the Sentencing Commission
were unsuccessfully challenged in Mistretta v. United States,29 based
upon constitutional delegation and separation of powers arguments.3 °
The Court quickly dismissed the delegation issue by describing the his-
torically low bar for administrative delegations, 3' and then addressed the
separation of powers concern that the integrity of the judicial branch may
be threatened by having judges review the constitutionality of mandatory
sentences created by fellow judges.32 The Court analogized the Sentenc-
ing Commission's functions to that of developing the Federal Rules of
Civil and Criminal Procedure,33 labeled those functions as within the
purview of the judicial branch,34 and found the vesting of those functions
within the judiciary to be acceptable under a flexible checks and balances
interpretation of separation of powers.35 Justice Scalia, in a scathing
dissent, viewed the functions of the Sentencing Commission as entirely
legislative and thus inappropriately exercised within the judicial
branch.36
After Mistretta, the Sentencing Guidelines were left undisturbed un-
til a series of Supreme Court cases regarding state criminal sentencing
provided a constitutional basis under the Sixth Amendment 37 for chal-
lenging the federal sentencing structure. An important initial break-
through occurred in Apprendi v. New Jersey,38 in which a slim five to
four majority of the Court established the rule: "any fact that increases
the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2005).
27. Id. (describing factors such as nature of the offense, effectuating the four purposes of
criminal punishment, any pertinent policy statement, sentencing consistency, and the need for resti-
tution).
28. Id. (requiring the judge to detail the specific reason for the sentence in a written order).
29. 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
30. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 370-71.
31. Id. at 371-80.
32. Id. at 383.
33. Id. at 392-93.
34. Id. at 396-97.
35. Id. at 412.
36. Id. at 413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (guaranteeing the right to a "public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed").
38. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt., 39 In Ap-
prendi, the defendant pled guilty to a state weapons offense with a statu-
tory maximum of ten years, among other charges. 40 However, under a
separate bias enhancement statute, the state judge imposed a twelve year
sentence after determining that the defendant was motivated by racial
animus.4 1 The Court struck down the enhanced sentence, finding that the
judge's use of facts not determined by a jury at sentencing violated the
jury trial right because the use of an additional fact is the functional
equivalent of an element, which juries must determine.42
An equally important extension of the Apprendi rule occurred in
Ring v. Arizona43 along the same slim majority. Ring was convicted of
felony murder, and Arizona state law required the judge to consider an
enumerated list of aggravating factors44 in addition to any mitigating
factors presented by the defense.45 The state judge sentenced Ring to
death, but the Court struck down the sentence after applying the Ap-
prendi rule and reasoning that if a "State makes an increase in a defen-
dant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that
fact-no matter how the State labels it-must be found by a jury beyond
a reasonable doubt."A
6
The next link in the chain was Blakely v. Washington,47 a case that
some scholars feel was an inevitable result of the Court's broad applica-
tion of the Appendi reasoning in the Ring decision. 48 Blakely pled guilty
to second degree kidnapping, an offense that was limited to a sentencing
range of forty-nine to fifty-three months under Washington's Sentencing
Reform Act.49 However, the judge found Blakely acted with "deliberate
cruelty,, 50 an aggravating factor which allowed the judge to increase the
sentence up to the ten year maximum, 51 and the judge imposed a sen-
tence of ninety months-three years over the suggested range but still
under the statutory maximum. 52 The Court again struck down the sen-
tence stating that the "relevant statutory maximum is not the maximum
sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the
39. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
40. Id. at 469-71.
41. Id. at 471.
42. Id. at 494 n.19, 497.
43. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
44. Ring, 536 U.S. at 592 n.1.
45. Id. at 592-93 (requiring the judge to find the existence of at least one aggravating factor
and no mitigating factors in order to impose the death penalty).
46. Id. at 602.
47. 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004).
48. David Y. Yellen, Reuschlein Lecture: Saving Federal Sentencing Reform After Apprendi,
Ring, Blakely, and Booker, 50 VILL. L. REV. 163, 170 (2005).
49. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.320 (2005).
50. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
51. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.390(2)(h)(iii) (current version at WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 9.94A.535(2)(a) (2005)).
52. Blakely, 124 S. Ct. at 2535.
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maximum he may impose without any additional findings. 53 Thus, all
facts forming the basis for any sentence exceeding a state sentencing
guideline must be found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, even if a
determination of that fact is expressly delegated to the judge's discretion
by the legislature.
The reasoning of Apprendi, Ring, and Blakely culminated with the
Court's determination in United States v. Booker54 that mandatory appli-
cation of the federal Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial.55 The combined defendants, Booker and Fan-
fan, faced similar circumstances at the federal level as the defendant in
Blakely, namely an enhancement of their sentences under judicially de-
termined aggravating factors.5 6 The Court reiterated the Apprendi rule
and included an additional caveat that allowed prior convictions to be
considered along with jury-determined facts.
57
In addition to holding that judge-determined sentence enhancement
violated the Sixth Amendment, the Court enacted a "remedial holding"
in which it excised two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act and
changed the nature of the Sentencing Guidelines from mandatory to ad-
visory.58 The impact of these two separate holdings, the primary and the
remedial, was to create two types of error under Booker. The first type is
called "constitutional Booker error" because it violates the Sixth
Amendment jury trial provision, and it arises when a defendant's sen-
tence was increased to a level above the guideline range based on non-
jury determined facts. 59  The second type of error is called "non-
constitutional Booker error" because mandatory application of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines now violates the express (albeit revised) wording of
the Sentencing Reform Act.60  The subtle point regarding non-
constitutional Booker error is that the sentence itself is fully constitu-
tional, and the only error is the statutorily violative act of mandatory
application as opposed to the advisory application required by the post-
Booker Sentencing Guidelines.
6'
Finally, the Court provided the following significant guidance to aid
lower courts in reviewing Booker challenges to sentences imposed under
the Sentencing Guidelines:
That does not mean that every sentence will give rise to a Sixth
Amendment violation or that every appeal will lead to a new sentenc-
53. Id. at 2537 (quotations omitted).
54. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
55. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
56. Id. at 746-47.
57. Id. at 756.
58. Id.
59. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 73 1.
60. Id. at 731-32.
61. See United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300-03 (11 th Cir. 2005).
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ing hearing. That is because reviewing courts are expected to apply
ordinary prudential doctrines, determining, e.g., whether the issue
was raised below and whether it fails the "plain-error" test. It is also
because, in cases not involving a Sixth Amendment violation,
whether resentencing is warranted or whether it will instead be suffi-
cient to review a sentence for reasonableness may depend upon ap-
plication of the harmless-error doctrine.
62
The reference to plain error review of sentencing cases is crucial to
understanding the subsequent impact of Booker on appellate review of
sentencing and the subsequent disparate treatment of that standard by
various Circuit courts.
B. Plain Error Analysis
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides: "plain error that
affects substantial rights may be considered even though it was not
brought to the court's attention., 63 Otherwise known as the "plain error
standard of review," Rule 52(b) allows a court to remedy egregious vio-
lations of justice and fairness even when a party has failed to object to
the issue at trial, and thus has effectively waived the issue on appeal.
64
The procedural rule codified the common law "plain error doctrine"
which allowed appeals courts to notice an error sua sponte regardless of
whether a party properly objected if the error "seriously affect[ed] the
fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings. 65 The
Court later described the purpose of Rule 52(b) as providing an avenue
for redressing miscarriages of justice.66
A complete framework for determining when plain error constituted
grounds for remand didn't develop until 1992 in United States v.
Olano.67 The error alleged in Olano was the trial court's decision to al-
low two alternate jurors to be present in the deliberation room with the
other twelve actual jurors, and the Court established the following four-
part test for analyzing plain error under Rule 52(b): (1) error occurred;
68
(2) the error was plain; 69 (3) the error affected substantial rights; 70 and (4)
62. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 738.
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b).
64. Id.
65. United States v. Atkinson, 297 U.S. 157, 160 (1936).
66. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982).
67. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
68. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732-33 (noting that error is any derivation from a legal rule that is not
waived). The Court also draws a distinction between "waiver" and "forfeiture"; the latter is the
failure to object, while the former is the "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right." Id. Waiver forecloses application of Rule 52(b), while forfeiture satisfies the first element.
Id.
69. Id. at 734 (describing the meaning of "plain" as equivalent to "clear" or "obvious").
70. Id. at 734-35 (further defining the requirement that the error affect the results of the trial
proceedings). Note that, in Olano, Justice O'Connor lists this third element as the final limitation,
but both courts and scholars include O'Connor's guidance regarding when appellate courts should
implement their optional discretion under Rule 52(b) as a fourth element. United States v. Burbage,
2006]
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invocation of the court's discretion under Rule 52(b) would remedy an
error that substantially affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation
ofjudicial proceedings.7'
The Court characterized plain error review as analogous to harmless
error review but with one substantial difference-the burden of persua-
sion rests with the defendant, not the government, under plain error re-
view for both the "substantial rights" and the "judicial integrity" ele-
ments.72 The Court relied on the discrepancy in language between Rules
52(a) and 52(b), the latter authorizing remedy only when the error does
affect substantial rights, as the source of the burden shifting.73 The Court
also placed emphasis on the need for a distinction between plain and
harmless error in order to encourage defendants to object.74 Finally,
based upon the specific facts of Olano, the Court concluded that no sub-
stantial rights were affected and reinstated the jury's verdict without de-
ciding upon the judicial integrity element.75
However, despite the general rule that the burden of persuasion lies
with the defendant, Olano provides a basis for two possible exceptions.
The majority describes a "special category of forfeited errors" and a class
of "errors that should be presumed prejudicial" but the majority specifi-
cally declines to address these categories. 76 Although the Court specifi-
cally declined to address the effect of these exceptions, the implication is
that the Court may exercise its discretion under Rule 52(b) and rectify
easily remedied and presumptively prejudicial errors despite any show-
ing of prejudice or effect on the proceedings.77
The commonly used term for the first of the Olano exceptions is
"structural error" and is defined as a "defect affecting the framework
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial
process itself., 78 Structural error is limited to very exceptional circum-
stances such as faulty jury instructions, 79 total denial of the right to coun-
sel, 80 and the lack of an impartial judge.8' Furthermore, a strong pre-
sumption against structural error exists when the right to counsel and the
365 F.3d 1174, 1180 (10th Cir. 2004); Jeffery L. Lowry, Plain Error Rule - Clarifying Plain Error
Analysis Under Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 84 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1065, 1072 (1994).
71. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735-37 (refusing to limit application of Rule 52(b) to when the defen-
dant is actually innocent).
72. Id. at 734-35.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 739-41.
76. Id. at 735.
77. Id. at 735-36.
78. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1986) (internal citation omitted).
79. Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 280 (1993).
80. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343-44 (1963).
81. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 523 (1927).
[Vol. 83:3
UNITED STATES V. GONZALEZ-HUERTA
right to an impartial adjudicator are satisfied. 2 Consequently, structural
error arguments are rarely successful. However, the existence of these
exceptions provides a point of departure for the federal circuits undertak-
ing review of non-constitutional Booker error, with some courts finding
the exceptions are satisfied and others finding they are not.
One final and important aspect of plain error review is that the Su-
preme Court consistently decides plain error cases by presuming the third
element is satisfied and deciding the case based solely upon the fourth
element.8 3  Since both prongs must be satisfied by the defendant, the
result is usually against the defendant, but the general technique of pre-
suming satisfaction of the third element is important in United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta.
II. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
A. United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta
8 4
In United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, the Tenth Circuit addressed
for the first time within its jurisdiction the standard of review applicable
to a defendant who alleged non-constitutional Booker error and raised the
issue for the first time on appeal. Prior to the Gonzalez-Huerta decision,
the Tenth Circuit had established that mandatory application of the Sen-
tencing Guidelines constituted harmful error warranting remand of the
sentence, 5 but now the court was faced with review under the plain error
standard, rather than the harmless error standard. The Tenth Circuit
heard the case en banc due to its importance.8 6
1. Facts
Sergio Gonzalez-Huerta was convicted of burglary in California in
1994 and served a prison term. 7 Six years after his conviction, Mr.
Gonzalez-Huerta was deported to Mexico, but was again apprehended in
New Mexico for possession of a controlled substance.88 While in jail on
the substance charge, federal authorities charged Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta
with illegal reentry by a deported alien convicted of an aggravated fel-
ony.8 9 Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta pled guilty to the charged offense and was
82. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 8 (1999).
83. See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469 (1997) ("[E]ven assuming that the failure
to submit materiality to the jury 'affected substantial rights,' it does not meet the final requirement of
Olano."); United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 632-33 (2002) ("[W]e need not resolve whether
respondents satisfy this element of the plain-error inquiry, because even assuming respondents'
substantial rights were affected, the error did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation ofjudicial proceedings.").
84. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
85. United States v. Labatstida-Segura, 396 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 2005).
86. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 731.
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sentenced to fifty-seven months. 90 When determining the sentence, the
only facts used by the district court included the fact of the prior burglary
conviction and those facts admitted by Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta in his
plea.91 According to the federal Sentencing Guidelines, Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta's offense level was twenty-one and his criminal history was
Category IV, which mandated a sentence between fifty-seven and sev-
enty-one months for the offense charged.92 The district court imposed
the minimum sentence, and Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta did not object to the
application of the Sentencing Guidelines during the proceedings. 93 The
groundbreaking decisions in Blakely v. Washington94 and United States v.
Booker95 were handed down subsequent to Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's sen-
tencing but prior to the hearing of his appeal.96
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta presented three theories for reversal on ap-
peal: the sentence imposed violated the Sixth Amendment as interpreted
by Booker, the district court's use of a prior conviction contravened the
Blakely holding, and a Due Process challenge to the sentence under
Hicks v. Oklahoma.97 The court quickly dismissed the latter two argu-
ments. The prior conviction challenge contravened the jurisprudential
rule that only the Supreme Court can overrule its own precedent,98 and
the Due Process challenge lacked the necessary statutory liberty interest
element.99
In his only remaining argument, Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta argued that
he should be resentenced according to the holdings of Blakely and
Booker.100 The central issue in the case, as framed by the Tenth Circuit,
was whether the mandatory application of the federal Sentencing Guide-
lines constitutes reversible error under plain error review when the only
facts relied upon at sentencing are prior convictions and those admitted
by the defendant.
2. Decision
The Tenth Circuit parted ways with its sister circuits and deter-





94. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
95. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
96. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 730.
97. 447 U.S. 343 (1980). Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta argued the legislature created a statutory
liberty interest in sentencing procedures that cannot be removed without due process, but failed to
specify which provision of the Sentencing Reform Act established any statutory interest. Gonzalez-
Huerta, 403 F.3d at 732 n.2.
98. Id. at 731 n. I (discussing the argument that Booker questioned the Supreme Court's ruling
in Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998)).
99. Id. at 732 n.2 (discussing Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's failure to allege the Sentencing Reform
Act created a statutory liberty interest).
100. Id at 730-31.
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itself does not satisfy the fourth element of plain error analysis, namely
the judicial integrity and fairness requirement, and therefore sentences
imposed based solely on prior convictions and admitted facts are not
eligible for remand.'0° The court initiated its analysis by determining
that the present facts represented non-constitutional Booker error,'0 2 the
proper standard of review was plain error,'0 3 and that the first two re-
quirements under Olano were satisfied.10 4 The court then stated that the
real issue in this case was whether Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta could satisfy the
third and fourth Olano elements, namely the substantial rights and judi-
cial integrity requirements.
Turning to the substantial rights element, the court described the
general rule that the defendant holds the burden to demonstrate "a rea-
sonable probability that, but for the error claimed, the result of the pro-
ceeding would have been different."' 1 5 Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta, instead of
addressing the burden directly, invoked the two Olano exceptions.
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta first argued that mandatory application of the
Sentencing Guidelines is structural error, and thus the burden is shifted to
the government. 0 6 The court held that non-constitutional Booker error is
not structural error for three reasons: (1) structural error must be consti-
tutional error, which non-constitutional Booker error is not; (2) the Neder
strong presumption against structural error exists in this case due to the
presence of counsel and an impartial judge; and (3) the "defining fea-
ture" of structural error isn't present in this case.' 0 7  According to the
court, the defining feature of structural error is that its effect on the pro-
ceedings is unquantifiable, 10 8 and non-constitutional Booker error is read-
ily quantifiable because if it is present, the court can find the substantial
rights element is satisfied.'0 9
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta then argued the significant change in well-
settled law wrought by Booker for cases on appeal, typically termed an
"intervening decision," created presumptively prejudicial error) ° The
101. Id. at 739.
102. Id. at 732 (discussing that the district court had not enhanced Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's
sentence based on judicially-determined facts, which would have violated the Sixth Amendment
under the Booker holding).
103. Id. (discussing that the appropriate standard was dictated by Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's fail-
ure to raise the issue below).
104. Id. (discussing that the district court's mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines
was clearly erroneous under the holding of Booker, and the error was clear at the time of appeal).
105. Id. at 733 (quoting United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 82 (2004)).
106. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 733.
107. Id. at 734.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Tenth Circuit points to the Eleventh Circuit's decision in United States v. Shelton,
400 F.3d 1325, 1328, 1332-33 (11 th Cir. 2005), as an example where the effect of prejudice is quan-
tified and then turns to the First Circuit's decision in United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68,
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Sixth Circuit adopted the presumptively prejudicial approach in United
States v. Barnett,I' and Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta asked the Tenth Circuit to
follow the Barnett approach."12 The Tenth Circuit declined the request
because the Supreme Court never used the presumptively prejudicial
exception to remand a case," 3 defendants alleging Booker error can
make an alternative showing of prejudice," 14 mitigating sentencing fac-
tors could and should have been presented to the District Court regard-
less of the Booker decision," 5 and allowing the burden to rest with the
government would substantially confuse the line between plain error
review and harmful error review.'
16
Having concluded that the defendant holds the burden under the
substantial rights prong, the court skipped the analysis of Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta's satisfaction of that burden and moved directly to the judicial
integrity prong of plain error review." 7 The court emphasized the sepa-
ration between the third and fourth prongs of plain error review, which
had been condensed by some other circuits," 18 and reiterated that the Su-
preme Court had "never shifted the burden to the [government] to estab-
lish that the error did not seriously affect the fairness ... of judicial pro-
ceedings."" 9 The court focused on the impact of intervening decisions
on the integrity of the judicial process, and concluded that mandatory
application of the Sentencing Guidelines did not result in a miscarriage
of justice and therefore Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta had no right to remand.
120
Of importance to the Tenth Circuit were the facts that non-constitutional,
as opposed to constitutional, Booker error occurred, Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta's sentence was within the national norm, and no mitigating evi-
dence appeared in the record.' 2' The court felt these facts mitigated the
impact of the error on judicial integrity because no "core notions of jus-
tice" were offended. 122 Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta failed his burden, accord-
ing to the court, because he presented no evidence other than a mere reci-
tation that injustice would result, which the court found insufficient.
123
Finally, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the District Court's sentence on the
111. 398 F.3d 516, 526-529 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (2005).
112. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 735.
113. Id. (noting that the Supreme Court had the opportunity to term an intervening decision as
presumptively prejudicial in Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 469-70 (1997), but failed to do
so).
114. Id. (noting several methods of demonstrating prejudice, which defeats the notion that the
defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice).
115. Id. (discussing the dissent by Chief Judge Boggs in Barnett, 398 F.3d at 537-38).
116. Id. (noting that an essential distinction between plain error and harmless error is that the
burden rests with the defendant in the former).
117. Id. at 736 (noting that a specific determination under the third prong is unnecessary be-
cause Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta holds the burden under the fourth prong as well).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 118 (2d Cir. 2005).
119. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 737.
120. Id. at 737-39.
121. Id. at 738-39.
122. Id. at 739.
123. Id. at 737-38.
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basis that Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta had failed to satisfy the fourth prong of
plain error review. 1
24
3. Concurrences
Three concurrences accompanied the majority decision authored by
Chief Judge Tacha, Judge Ebel, and Judge Hartz. Chief Judge Tacha,
joined by Judge Kelly, Judge Murphy, Judge O'Brien, Judge McConnell,
and Judge Tymkovich, wrote separately to conclude that Mr. Gonzalez-
Huerta had failed the third prong of plain error review as well as the
fourth prong. 125  Chief Judge Tacha criticized Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's
failure to present any mitigating evidence, which left the record devoid
of anything but speculation that suggested a lower sentence would be
imposed on remand. 26 Chief Judge Tacha also took the opportunity to
engage in a statistics battle with the dissent in order to counter the argu-
ment that the third and fourth prongs are satisfied per se by the signifi-
cant number of district judges that were imposing sentences below the
Guidelines range after Booker.127 The United States Sentencing Com-
mission had compiled figures on severity of federal sentences imposed
after Booker,128 which Chief Judge Tacha compared to pre-Booker fig-
ures and concluded that there was only a 1.8 percent increase in the
number of sentences imposed below the Sentencing Guidelines, while
there was also a 1.1 percent increase in the number of sentences imposed
above the Sentencing Guidelines. 129 Consequently, according to Chief
Judge Tacha, there can be no inference drawn from statistics that a lower
sentence is likely because the chance of a higher sentence is roughly
equivalent.
30
Both Judges Ebel and Hartz wrote separately primarily to put forth
additional analysis under the fourth prong. Judge Ebel, who interestingly
agreed with the majority on the fourth prong but sided with the dissent
on the third prong, 13 set forth three factors to be considered under the
judicial integrity element: (1) constitutionality of the error; (2) whether
the defendant's sentence falls within the Guidelines range; and (3)
whether the record on its face suggests the district court was likely to
impose a different sentence. 32 Judge Ebel concluded that all three fac-
tors weighed against Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta and thus his sentence should
be affirmed. 33 Judge Hartz viewed the fourth prong through a wide lens,
124. Id. at 739.
125. Id. at 739-40 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
126. Id. at 740 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
127. Id. at 741 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
128. Linda D. Maxfield, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, Data Extract on March 3: Numbers on
Post-Booker Sentencings at 2 (Mar. 22, 2005), http://www.famm.org/pdfs/booker_032205.pdf
129. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 741 (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
130. Id. (Tacha, C.J., concurring).
131. Id. at 742 (Ebel, J., concurring)
132. Id. at 743 (Ebel, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 744 (Ebel, J., concurring).
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stating the "fairness" to be considered is determined according to the
federal justice system as a whole, not just the particular sentence in any
one case. 34 Given the purpose of the Sentencing Guidelines was to cre-
ate uniformity between similarly situated defendants, Judge Hartz stated
that allowing a remand in Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's case may actually harm
fairness.1 35 Remand of every sentence would result in more disparate
sentences, which undermines the fundamental purpose of the Sentencing
Guidelines and thus results in unfairness to the federal criminal justice
system in general.136 Judge Hartz implied the source of this disparity is
"the disconnect between the constitutional violation and the remedy" in
Booker because it created a unique situation where the constitutional




Judges Briscoe and Lucero dissented separately from the majority
decision, with the former authoring the main dissent. Judge Briscoe
challenged the majority's opinion on the basis that the burden should not
rest with the defendant to show prejudice. 38 Judge Briscoe explained
three paths to accomplish that goal: harmless-error review should be ap-
plied in lieu of plain error, the presumptively prejudicial Olano exception
should apply, or the intervening decision doctrine could be applied in
every non-constitutional Booker error case to shift the burden away from
the defendant.'
39
While conceding that Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta failed to object to the
mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines at trial, Judge
Briscoe argued that Booker error does not mesh with the traditional dis-
tinction between harmless and plain error because the defendant had no
true opportunity to object.' 40 Judge Briscoe noted that, at the time of
trial, not one person, ranging from defense counsel to the judge, knew
that an objection to the mandatory application would have any effective-
ness.141  Thus, the mandatory application of the Guidelines "substan-
tially undermined any need or incentive for sentencing courts pre-Booker
to note their objections" and deprived Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta of any mean-
134. Id. at 746-47 (Hartz, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 745-46 (Hartz, J., concurring).
136. Id. at 747 (Hartz, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 745 (Hartz, J., concurring).
138. Id. at 753 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
139. Id. at 750, 753-55 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
140. Id. at 750-53 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
141. See id. at 747 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
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ingful opportunity to object. 142 Since the defendant had no opportunity
to object, the burden should rest on the government.1
43
Judge Briscoe suggested the application of harmless-error review
and the intervening decision doctrine as possible solutions,' 44 but she
mainly relied on the Olano presumptively prejudicial exception as the
actual solution. 145 Citing the significant number of defendants who were
given below-Guidelines sentences post-Booker and the practical impos-
sibility of showing prejudice outside of fortuitous statements by the
judge, Judge Briscoe fell in line with the Sixth Circuit 146 and concluded
that prejudice should be presumed in non-constitutional Booker error
cases as a matter of course. 14 7 Judge Briscoe then analyzed the applica-
tion of her perception of plain error review to the instant case, which
took on a decidedly different flavor from the majority opinion.148  The
presumption of prejudice automatically satisfied the third prong, and the
accompanying assumption that a lighter sentence was inevitable satisfied
the fourth prong. 1
49
The final dissenting opinion, Judge Lucero's, further exemplified
the diversity of views amongst the Tenth Circuit judges.' 50 Judge Lucero
agreed with Judge Briscoe's analysis of the fourth prong based on the
hypothesis that if the fourth prong could not be satisfied by mandatory
application, then the Supreme Court would have had no reason to remand
Fanfan's sentence for further sentencing.' 51 However, Judge Lucero
wrote separately to express solidarity with the "limited remand" position
of the Second and Seventh Circuits regarding the third prong. 152 The
limited remand would allow the district judge to determine if a lighter
sentence could be imposed, and if needed, impose it. 153
Obviously, there is a wide range of sentiments among the judges
within the Tenth Circuit, which indicates the likely diversity of opinion
among the other federal circuits. The following section explores the dif-
ferent approaches to judicial review by the appellate circuits in regards to
142. Id. at 752 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 529
(6th Cir. 2005)).
143. See id. at 753 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 749, 755 (Briscoe, J., dissenting) (noting the four main directives that result from the
language in Booker, with application of harmless error review as one of them).
145. Id. at 753 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
146. See Barnett, 398 F.3d at 527-28.
147. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 754 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 756-59 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 757-59 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
150. See id. at 761-63 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (providing the third point of view on the proper
analysis of the substantial rights prong).
151. Id. at 761 (Lucero, I., dissenting).
152. Id. at 762 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
153. Id. at 762 (Lucero, J., dissenting) (quoting the Second Circuit's decision in United States
v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005)).
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post-Booker sentencing. The sentiment surrounding the discrepancy
among the circuits was best captured by Judge Lucero's dissent:
The division on this court over the proper approach to Booker cases
pending direct review is replicated among the various circuit courts.
This wide ranging circuit split results in the disparate treatment of
criminal defendants throughout the nation. Such uneven administra-




Below is an overview of the different federal circuit positions:
Position Circuit Decision
Hard-line Approach 1st United States v. Antonakopoulos1
55
Decided on Third Prong 5th United States v. Mares
156
Burden on Defendant 8th United States v. Pirani
157
11Ith United States v. Rodriguez
158
Compromise Approach 10th United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta159
Decided on Fourth Prong
Burden on Defendant
Limited Remand 2d United States v. Crosby
160
7th United States v. Paladino'
61
9th United States v. Ameline
162
D.C. United States v. Coles
163
Presumption of Prejudice 4th United States v. Hughes (Hughes )
164
Burden on Government United States v. Hughes (Hughes 11)165
6th United States v. Barnett
166
No Set Standard 3d United States v. Davis
167
Automatic Remand
154. Id. at 763 (Lucero, J. dissenting).
155. 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005).
156. 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517).
157. 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 05-
5547).
158. 398 F.3d 1291 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No.
04-1148).
159. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
160. 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
161. 401 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (U.S.,
Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-10402).
162. 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
163. 403 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
164. 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005).
165. 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005).
166. 398 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-
1690).
167. 407 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2005).
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While each case indicates a particular stance, their fact patterns differ
slightly, which can be outcome-determinative. The analysis will proceed
from the defendant's perspective: harshest to lightest.
1. Burden on the Defendant to Demonstrate Prejudice
The First, Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits each adopted a hard-
line stance towards plain error review, namely the burden rests with the
defendant to satisfy the third prong of Olano.16 8 All four of these circuits
additionally reached determinations that a trial judge's use of sentencing
enhancements not found by a jury, which constitutes Blakely error, does
not warrant remand per se, 169 and neither circuit gave deference to the
argument that remand is more suitable when Blakely error occurs.
In the Eleventh Circuit's Rodriguez decision, which was decided
first, the sentence of a convicted ecstasy dealer was based on the drug
quantity and enhanced due to obstruction of justice, which were both
facts found by the judge instead of the jury.170 The Eleventh Circuit de-
scribed the immense difficulty of overcoming the defendant's burden
under the third prong by stating, "[I]f it is equally plausible that the error
worked in favor of the defense, the defendant loses; if the effect of the
error is uncertain so that we do not know which, if either, side it
helped[,] the defendant loses." 17' Having concluded that the burden was
not satisfied by Mr. Rodriguez, the Eleventh Circuit criticized the pre-
sumed prejudicial and limited remand approaches of the Fourth, Sixth
and Second Circuits. 72 In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit both reiterated
the principle that the mere use of sentencing enhancements is not uncon-
stitutional under Booker' 73 and emphasized that the job of Booker review
lies with the appellate courts, not the trial courts.
74
168. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct.
3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (1 1th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1148).
169. See Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 79 (rejecting aper se remand of all cases where sentence
enhancements were used); Mares, 402 F.3d at 521 (agreeing with the Eleventh Circuit's characteri-
zation of Booker error); Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300 (noting that Justice Breyer's majority opinion
expressly stated the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional once the mandatory provisions were
excised).
170. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1294 (noting the jury failed to make a determination on the
drug quantity and that the pre-sentencing report recommended an enhancement based on lying under
oath).
171. Id. at 1300.
172. Id. at 1301-02.
173. Id. at 1303-04 (noting that both the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d
374 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Sixth Circuit in United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005),
stated the constitutional error was the use of sentencing enhancements that were not found by a
jury).
174. Id. at 1305 ("The determination of plain error is the duty of courts of appeal, not district
courts.").
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Without a substantial degree of analysis, the Fifth Circuit agreed
heavily with the Rodriguez decision and wholly adopted its reasoning in
United States v. Mares, 75 which affirmed the conviction and the sen-
tence of a felon in possession of ammunition. 176 The primary emphasis
for both of these circuits is whether a substantially different result would
have occurred at trial under an advisory guidelines scheme. 177 If the re-
cord is silent or the defendant cannot reasonably show that a different
result is probable, then the defendant loses.
178
The First Circuit reached essentially the same conclusions as the
Eleventh and the Fifth Circuits in United States v. Antonakopoulos,179 but
provided some additional guidance for when remand is appropriate under
Booker. 80 Specifically, the court stated that remand is more appropriate
in the following circumstances: when the district judge misapplies the
guidelines;' 81 when mitigating circumstances existed at trial but could
not be considered under the mandatory regime; 82 when the trial judge
expresses on record that the Sentencing Guidelines were unfair; 183 and
when a reasonable probability exists that the result would have been dif-
ferent.' 84 In the end, the First Circuit used the traditional plain error ap-
proach to affirm the sentence of a bank manager who embezzled from his
employer that was based not only on the jury findings, but also on the
pre-sentence report and sentence enhancements.
85
The Eighth Circuit benefited from deciding United States v. Pi-
rani 86 well after the decisions of most of the sister circuits, and decided
that the proper approach among the splits is that of the First, Fifth, and
Eleventh Circuits. 187 A former sheriffs deputy in Arkansas was con-
victed of making false statements to federal investigators who suspected
that deputies were stealing drug money seized during the course of their
duties.188 The Eighth Circuit agreed that the third Olano factor depended
upon a defendant's showing a reasonable probability that a different sen-
tence would have been imposed, 89 but the court parted ways with the
175. 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517).
176. Mares, 402 F.3d at 521-22.
177. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1302; Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.
178. See Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 1300; Mares, 402 F.3d at 521.
179. 399 F.3d 68 (lst Cir. 2005).




184. Id. (noting that this final situation can overcome silence by the trial judge).
185. Id. at 84.
186. 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 05-
5547).
187. Pirani, 406 F.3d at 547.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 551-52 (noting its agreement with the First, Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh
Circuits on this point).
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limited remand circuits on the basis that such a "creative approach" vio-
lates the express command from the Supreme Court in Booker to apply
ordinary prudential doctrines. 190 Consequently, the defendant's sentence
was affirmed after he failed to satisfy the Olano third prong burden. 191
2. Limited Remand
Four circuits have adopted the middle-ground approach of limited
remand for the purpose of determining whether the defendant was preju-
diced by the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guidelines.' 92 The
Second Circuit was the first to articulate this standard in United States v.
Crosby'93 as a "remand to the district court, not for the purpose of a re-
quired resentencing, but only for the more limited purpose of permitting
the sentencing judge to determine whether to resentence, now fully in-
formed of the new sentencing regime, and if so, to resentence."'
194
Crosby involved a felon who pled guilty to possession of a firearm and
was sentenced based on his plea, two prior convictions for violent of-
fenses, and three sentence enhancements for behavior during the act and
subsequent investigation. 95 The Second Circuit agreed that the use of
sentencing enhancements didn't violate the Constitution after Booker
because the enhancements didn't push the defendant over the "statutory
maximum" as required by Apprendi.196  However, the Second Circuit
stated that a proper application of plain error review requires knowing
what the sentencing judge would have done, which wasn't likely under
the pre-Booker regime, and thus limited remand was required.
197
The Seventh Circuit followed the Crosby approach in remanding the
sentences of several defendants in a consolidated appeal in United States
v. Paladino.198 In a colorful opinion, the Seventh Circuit described the
"epistemic fog" of not knowing what course of action the trial judge
would have taken in a discretionary scheme and decided the most ra-
tional approach to Booker review was to simply ask the trial judge. 199 In
reaching this conclusion, the Seventh Circuit determined that the fatal
190. Id. at 552.
191. Id. at 553 (noting that the fourth prong need not be considered because the third prong is
unsatisfied).
192. See United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino,
401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (2005);
United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d
764, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
193. 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005).
194. Crosby, 397 F.3d at 117.
195. Id. at 106 (noting that the defendant had recklessly endangered the life of a police officer,
created a substantial risk of injury for a police officer, and had obstructed justice).
196. Id. at 109 n.6.
197. Id. at 118-19.
198. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 485. The court affirmed the convictions of all the defendants and
the sentence of one defendant, Peyton, who challenged his sentence on the basis of a "recidivist"
enhancement, which the Seventh Circuit stated was not affected by Booker. Id at 480.
199. Paladino, 401 F.3d at 482, 484.
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flaw in the presumed prejudice approach is that no prejudice results if the
trial judge would impose the same sentence,2" and the hardline refusal to
remand unjustly "condem[s] some unknown fraction of criminal defen-
dants to serve an illegal sentence.,
20'
Similarly, in United States v. Ameline,20 2 the Ninth Circuit re-
manded a sentence where the defendant pled guilty to possession of
"some methamphetamine.,, 20 3 The trial judge utilized the pre-sentencing
figure of 1,079.3 grams of methamphetamine as the basis for sentencing,
which the Ninth Circuit stated resulted in constitutional error that de-
manded resentencing under Booker.204  The Ninth Circuit expressly
agreed with the limited remand approach.2 °5
Finally, in a relatively short opinion, the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit adopted the Crosby limited remand approach in United States v.
Coles.2 °6 The court remanded the sentence of a former Special Assistant
to the Secretary of the District of Columbia convicted of attempting to
obtain grant money fraudulently because the record was unclear as to
whether the defendant was prejudiced.20 7 The most interesting aspect of
the Coles decision is the D.C. Circuit's criticism of the presumed preju-
dicial approach that "courts employing this approach assess error and
prejudice as if the pre-Booker, mandatory sentencing regime were still in
place, and as if the error were judicial factfinding under that regime."
208
The skewed perspective of the Fourth and Ninth Circuits, according to
the D.C. Circuit, directly conflicts with the Booker guidance by ignoring
what the trial judge would have done.209
3. Presumed Prejudicial
The final prominent position taken by the federal circuits is that of
the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, which remand any sentence which is in-
creased based on any fact not found by a jury, including pre-sentencing
reports and sentencing enhancements.21 0  This position was first de-
scribed by the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Hughes,2 ' which af-
200. Id. at 483 (criticizing the Sixth Circuit's decision in United States v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369
(6th Cir. 2005)).
201. Id. at 484-85.
202. 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005).
203. Ameline, 409 F.3d at 1075.
204. Id. at 1075, 1078.
205. Id. at 1079-80.
206. 403 F.3d 764, 765 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
207. Coles, 403 F.3d at 765, 769-70.
208. Id. at 768.
209. Id.
210. See United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Hughes 1];
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Hughes 11]; United States v.
Banett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-
1690).
211. 396 F.3d 374 (4th Cir. 2005).
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firmed a defendant's convictions but remanded his sentence. 212 Hughes
was convicted by a jury of bankruptcy fraud and perjury, but the judge
imposed a forty-six month sentence based on five enhancements which
the jury did not find.13 The Fourth Circuit framed the constitutional
violation as judicial action which "imposes a sentence greater than the
maximum authorized by the facts found by the jury alone. 214 There was
neither mention of the statutory maximum nor any reference to the por-
tion of the Booker decision which authorized the use of sentencing en-
hancements.21 5
The Fourth Circuit concluded that plain error review was the proper
standard because Hughes raised his Sixth Amendment challenge for the
first time on appeal,216 but then proceeded to find that plain error had
occurred because each of the four Olano prongs were satisfied.217 The
third prong was satisfied by the discrepancy in the Guidelines range be-
tween Offense Level 10, which the jury facts warranted, and Offense
Level 22, which was the actual level used as enhanced by five judge-
found factors. 218 Likewise, the Fourth Circuit held the fourth prong was
satisfied due to the major change in federal sentencing law that Booker
imposed.219 Oddly enough, the Fourth Circuit, when providing guidance
to the trial judge for resentencing, determined that the "district court cor-
rectly determined the range prescribed by the guidelines, on remand the
court shall consider that range, 22 ° which seems to contradict the deter-
mination that use of sentencing enhancements to increase the guidelines
range violates the Sixth Amendment.22'
The Fourth Circuit reiterated its position in response to stark criti-
cism from other circuits, particularly the Eleventh Circuit, when it
granted a rehearing before a three judge panel.222 In Hughes II, the
Fourth Circuit essentially amended its decision in Hughes I with addi-
tional analysis under the third and fourth Olano prongs.223 Chief Judge
Wilkins, writing for the majority, drew support mainly from Kotteakos v.
United States224 for the proposition that the main goal of the substantial
rights inquiry was not to decide the outcome of an error-free trial, but
rather to determine the reasonable effect the error had on the proceed-
212. Hughes 1, 396 F.3d at 376.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 378.
215. See id. at 379 (noting that the prescribed Guidelines-range for the facts found by the jury
authorized a 12-month maximum sentence, which the 46-month actual sentence clearly exceeds).
216. Id. at 379.
217. Id. at 380-81.
218. Id. at 380.
219. Id. at 380-81.
220. Id. at 385 (noting that the other factors under the Sentencing Guidelines should be consid-
ered as well).
221. 1d. at 378.
222. Hughes 1, 401 F.3d at 543.
223. Hughes 11, 401 F.3d at 548.
224. 328 U.S. 750 (1946).
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ing.225 If the reasonable effect is ambiguous, then the court cannot con-
clude that the defendant's substantial rights were not affected.226 Fur-
thermore, the Fourth Circuit stated that the appropriate examination of
the substantial rights prong is "whether the district court could have im-
posed the sentence it did without exceeding the relevant Sixth Amend-
ment limitation,, 227 which can never be satisfied when sentencing en-
hancements were used because they are not facts found by a jury.228
The Sixth Circuit followed the Fourth Circuit's decision in Hughes I
with its decision in United States v. Barnett.229 The Barnett defendant
was convicted of gun possession and sentenced to 265 months based on
three prior violent felonies. 230  The Sixth Circuit held that prejudice
should be presumed because the defendant may have received a sentence
as low as 180 months, the statutory minimum, and the inherent nature of
Booker error made it exceptionally difficult to make a showing of preju-
dice.231
Finally, the Third Circuit appears to follow the "presumed prejudi-
cial" approach, but has declined to expressly adopt any specific line of
reasoning.232 The Third Circuit consistently remands Booker cases for
resentencing under the rationale that, "[T]he sentencing issues appellant
raises are best determined by the District Court in the first instance, [con-
sequently] we will vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in
accordance with Booker."233 However, the Third Circuit provides only
cryptic reasoning for its automatic remand approach. In an en banc deci-
sion, Judge Scirica stated in dicta that prejudice should be presumed be-
cause "mandatory sentencing was governed by an erroneous scheme.9
2 34
Furthermore, the court viewed the possibility of stripping discretion from
the trial court as sufficient harm to the integrity of the judicial system.235
III. ANALYSIS
The only undisputed principle in all sentencing challenges after
United States v. Booker2 36 is that plain error occurs through the manda-
tory application of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The clarity ends
there, as several unresolved issues regarding plain error review as estab-
225. Hughes 11, 401 F.3d at 548.
226. Id. (quoting Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 765).
227. Id. at 551.
228. See id. at 548 (noting that the maximum sentence under the facts found solely by the jury
would have been 12 months).
229. 398 F.3d 516 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-
1690).
230. Id. at 521.
231. Id. at 526-27.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 405 F.3d 145, 150 (3d Cir. 2005).
233. Id. at 150. See also United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc).
234. Davis, 407 F.3d at 165.
235. Id.
236. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
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lished in United States v. Olano2 3 7 have led to a wide-ranging circuit
split. The dispute centers on the prejudice created by mandatory sentenc-
ing, and understanding the pros and cons of each circuit's approach is
crucial to analyzing the effectiveness of the Tenth Circuit's decision in
United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta.23 s Moreover, the limitations of plain
error review, particularly its ability to address sweeping changes in set-
tled law, must also be examined as a contributing source of the disparity
in post-Booker review. Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit reached the correct
outcome in Gonzalez-Huerta through reliance on the judicial integrity
requirement of plain error review, although burdening criminal defen-
dants to demonstrate prejudice is fundamentally unfair and should not be
followed.
A. Requiring the Unknown
The Tenth Circuit incorrectly agreed with the hardline circuits by
placing the burden of satisfying the third Olano prong with the defen-
dant, which requires him to demonstrate a reasonable probability of
prejudice.239 The Fourth and Sixth Circuits presume prejudice in post-
Booker review based on the language in 01ano24 0 and the difficulty of
establishing that a different outcome would result under an advisory sen-
tencing regime. 241 The Tenth Circuit rejected the "presume prejudice"
approach because the Supreme Court had never mentioned nor applied
such a presumption after its mere mention in Olano.242  Specifically,
Chief Judge Tacha cited the Court's decision in Johnson v. United
States,243 which addressed an intervening decision and failed to mention
presuming prejudice in its analysis.244 However, Johnson indirectly pre-
sumed prejudice by "assuming that the failure to submit materiality to
the jury affected substantial rights., 245 Also, reliance on the lack of addi-
tional case support for presuming prejudice is misguided, particularly
given that Olano was decided within the last fifteen years.246 Insufficient
time to develop may be equally culpable for the Supreme Court's failure
to mention presuming prejudice, and thus should not be cited as support
for rejecting such an approach. Finally, if any situation satisfies the in-
tent of the Olano exception, the significant change wrought by Booker's
intervening decision should qualify. The only other Supreme Court case
237. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
238. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
239. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 736.
240. Olano, 507 U.S. at 735 (noting that some errors "should be presumed prejudicial if the
defendant cannot make a specific showing of prejudice").
241. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barnett,
398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20,2005) (No. 04-1690).
242. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 735.
243. 520 U.S. 461 (1997).
244. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 735.
245. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469 (quotations omitted).
246. Olano, 507 U.S. at 725 (decided in 1993).
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to address the impact of an intervening decision was Johnson, which
considered the change to materiality determinations in United States v.
Gaudin,247 and that decision assumed the prejudice element to be satis-
fied. 24 8
The Tenth Circuit also refused to presume prejudice because a
criminal defendant could possibly demonstrate prejudice based on the
record.249  The most common avenue for demonstrating prejudice is
through judicial comment that a lower sentence is warranted.250 How-
ever, the majority's characterization is essentially a straw man that "ig-
nores the reality of the pre-Booker sentencing landscape ' 251 where judi-
cial comments criticizing the Sentencing Guidelines are unnecessary and
discouraged by existing case law. Guiding principles should not be sup-
ported by their extremes, and the presence of sufficient evidence in the
trial record to establish prejudice is certainly an extreme situation in
post-Booker challenges.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit relied on the need to maintain a distinc-
tion between plain error and harmless error review as support for its posi-
tion.252 The Supreme Court likewise cited concern for distinguishing
plain and harmless error as a reason for placing the burden with the de-
253fendant in plain error review. However, the main policy support for
shifting the burden, which rests with the government in harmless error
review, is the need to encourage defendants to object timely and assert
their rights as a fundamental part of the adversary system.254 Most, if not
all, plain error post-Booker sentencing challenges do not satisfy the pol-
icy of encouraging objections because the affected defendants did not
know at the time of their trial that a legal right to object to mandatory
application of the Sentencing Guidelines existed. As stated by Judge
Briscoe in her dissent, "there was no opportunity or incentive, as there is
now post-Booker, for Gonzalez-Huerta or the government to present evi-
dence or arguments outside of the bounds allowed by the Guidelines. 255
In a similar vein, the Second Circuit stated, "[i]f we were to penalize
defendants for failing to challenge entrenched precedent, we would be
insisting upon an omniscience on the part of defendants ... [and] would
only encourage frivolous objections and appeals. 256 Therefore, the need
for a true distinction between plain and harmless error is minimal, and
247. 515 U.S. 506 (1995).
248. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467.
249. Gonzalez-Huerla, 403 F.3d at 735-36.
250. United States v. Shelton, 400 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11 th Cir. 2005).
251. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 752 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 736.
253. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734-35.
254. See Lowry, supra note 70, at 1080 (quoting United States v. Silverstein, 732 F.2d 1338,
1349 (7th Cir. 1984)).
255. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 751 (Briscoe, J., dissenting).
256. United States v. Viola, 35 F.3d 37,42 (2d Cir. 1994).
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although the failure to object should give rise to plain error review, de-
fendants should not be doubly penalized by a strict enforcement of the
burden, which would otherwise rest with the government under the
common law plain error doctrine.257
Furthermore, general policy arguments support adopting of presum-
ing prejudice under the third prong of Olano. Conceding prejudice
within the context of significant intervening decisions prevents under-
mining the fairness of judicial proceedings. Requiring defendants to
produce the unknown, namely the actions a sentencing judge would have
perused under an advisory regime, is fundamentally unfair. The "limited
remand" approach of the Second, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Colum-
bia Circuits addresses the fairness issue, but it fails to meet the judicial
efficiency goals of plain error review. Assuming prejudice would allow
the appellate courts to decide Booker cases based upon the impact to the
integrity of the judiciary, which is more reliant on policy considerations
which appeals courts are best equipped to handle.
Since the burden under the third Olano prong should rest with the
government in post-Booker review cases, the arguments presented by
Chief Judge Tacha and Judge Briscoe regarding satisfaction of that bur-
den are moot. However, one prominent aspect of Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's
case that was ignored by both sides of the debate, and indeed every cir-
cuit to address Booker review, is the fact that Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta was
sentenced to the absolute minimum within the proscribed sentencing
258range. Supporters of remand could cite minimum range application as
an implicit statement by the sentencing judge that he would impose a
lower sentence if it were possible. Although the ability of minimum
range application to demonstrate prejudice is tenuous, it provides a valu-
able argument when faced with the alternative of a silent trial record and
may persuade a court to grant limited remand.
B. Preserving Reason
Despite the limitations of the prejudice element analysis, the Tenth
Circuit's analysis and conclusion under the judicial integrity element
provided the saving grace of the Gonzalez-Huerta decision. Even if
prejudice to the defendant is presumed, remand is only warranted if the
prejudice results in a miscarriage of justice.25 9 Thus, the reviewing ap-
pellate court can exercise its discretion under the fourth Olano prong
when the circumstances of the case deserve remedy, but can decline if
the circumstances do not. The Supreme Court followed this exact rea-
soning in Johnson, where it examined the merits of the underlying mate-
riality dispute and declined to remand because the evidence supporting
257. See Lowry, supra note 70, at 1078-80.
258. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 730.
259. Id. at 736-37 (citing United States v. Gilkey, 118 F.3d 702, 704 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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the trial court's ruling was "overwhelming., 260  Likewise in Gonzalez-
Huerta, the judicial integrity element provided a dispositive basis of de-
cision because Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta failed to, and indeed was unable to,
provide evidence that mandatory application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines caused injustice.26'
The fairness of Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's sentence is, similar to John-
son, overwhelming. The only enhancement used at sentencing was the
prior conviction, 26 which Booker expressly approved. 263 The trial court
imposed the minimum sentence of the corresponding sentencing range.264
Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta presented no mitigating evidence which was re-
jected by the mandatory regime.265 Most importantly, the Sentencing
Guidelines are still used as the national standard and meant to provide
consistency among criminal defendants. 266 Although the recent trend in
sentencing is the increased imposition of below-guidelines sentences,
267
the overwhelming majority of post-Booker sentences are within the Sen-
tencing Guidelines. 268  As a result, Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta's sentence is
conclusively fair because it comports with the national norm and is based
solely on constitutional facts, and as such does not give rise to the neces-
sary "miscarriage of justice" required for plain error remand.
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's guidance for handling post-
Booker review expressly stated that not every appeal would lead to re-
sentencing, 269 and that guidance would be vitiated entirely if remand was
granted in Gonzalez-Huerta.27 0 The only possible prejudice to Mr. Gon-
zalez-Huerta was the mandatory application of the Sentencing Guide-
lines.2 7' Therefore, if remand were granted, it would implicitly amount
to a statement that mandatory application alone is sufficient to warrant
resentencing. Since every pre-Booker sentence was statutorily required
to be mandatory, then every sentence would have to be remanded. Such
a result violates the express intent of the Supreme Court and cannot be
rationally sustained. Consequently, the automatic remand approaches of
260. Johnson, 520 U.S. at 469-70.
261. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 737-38.
262. Id. at 730.
263. 125 S. Ct. 738, 756 (2005).
264. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 730.
265. See id at 735-36.
266. See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996).
267. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, SPECIAL POST-BOOKER CODING PROJECT
DATA EXTRACTION DATE: DECEMBER 21, 2005 at 1 (Jan. 5, 2006),
http://www.ussc.gov/Blakely/PostBooker 010506.pdf (noting that only 1.7% of cases sentenced
subsequent to the Booker decision are above the guidelines, while 37.1% of the cases are below the
guidelines, although 24.4% of the below-guidelines sentences are government sponsored).
268. Id. at 1 (noting that 61.2% of cases sentenced subsequent to the Booker decision are
within the guidelines).
269. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 769 (2005).
270. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
271. Id. at 730-31 (noting the basis of sentencing was limited to admitted facts and prior con-
victions).
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the Second, Third, Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits,
even if limited, cannot be sustained for this reason.272 The Fourth and
Sixth Circuits' "presumed prejudicial" approach also fails under the Su-
preme Court's limits on remand because both circuits compress the sepa-
rate elements under Olano, so instead of merely presuming prejudice to
the defendant, the court also presumes injustice results regardless of the
circumstances in individual cases.2 73 Failure to distinguish between the
third and fourth Olano prongs, when combined with presuming preju-
dice, holds the same effect as the Third Circuit's "automatic remand"
approach. Consequently, the only feasible approaches are those of the
First, Fifth, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits because they preclude
remand in every case.274
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta
275
establishes the correct outcome under the holding of United States v.
Booker2 76 and the judicial integrity element of plain error review estab-
lished in United States v. Olano.27 Fairness warrants providing the de-
fendant with leniency regarding prejudicial effect of the plain error, par-
ticularly caused by an intervening decision requiring a defendant to see
the future in order to properly object in good faith. However, unless the
asserted error causes a miscarriage of justice or fails to comport with
appropriate policy considerations, then the reviewing court should refuse
to exercise its discretion under the fourth Olano prong.
One technique the Tenth Circuit would be well-advised to adopt is
avoidance of disparate treatment through broad interpretation of the ob-
jection required to trigger harmless error review. The First Circuit has
supported such an approach in United States v. Heldeman278 and United
States v. Antonakopoulos.279 The Antonakopoulos court viewed any ar-
272. See United States v. Davis, 407 U.S. 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2005); United States v. Crosby,
397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, Peyton v. United States, 126 S. Ct. 106 (U.S., Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-10402); United States v.
Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078-79 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 768 (D.C.
Cir. 2005).
273. See United States v. Hughes, 396 F.3d 374, 376 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Hughes,
401 F.3d 540, 548 (4th Cir. 2005); United States v. Barnett, 398 F.3d 516, 526 (6th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 33 (U.S. Sept. 20, 2005) (No. 04-1690).
274. See United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v.
Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-
9517); United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct.
3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-6407); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d
1291, 1300 (11 th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 2935 (U.S. June 20, 2005) (No. 04-1148).
275. 403 F.3d 727 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 495 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2005) (No. 05-
6407).
276. 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
277. 507 U.S. 725 (1993).
278. 402 F.3d 220 (1st Cir. 2005).
279. 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005).
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gument under Apprendi v. New Jersey,28 0 Blakely v. Washington, or a
general challenge to the constitutionality of the Sentencing Guidelines as
sufficient to trigger harmless error,282 which typically results in remand
for resentencing.283 Avoidance of customarily applying plain error re-
view would help mitigate the disparate treatment of similarly situated
defendants that are merely separated by the passage of time, during
which the Blakely and Booker arguments became available and provided
defendants with a basis to object. Specifically, the Tenth Circuit could
avoid the disparity exemplified by the cases of Mr. Gonzalez-Huerta and
Mr. Labastida-Segura. Mr. Labastida-Segura pled guilty to reentering
the United States after being deported, and was sentenced based on ad-
mitted facts and a prior felony conviction.284 Despite the striking similar-
ity in circumstances to Gonzalez-Huerta, the Tenth Circuit remanded for
resentencing. 285 The only distinction was that Mr. Labastida-Segura's
trial was not conducted until after the Blakely decision and he prudently
filed a motion to have the Sentencing Guidelines declared unconstitu-
tional,28 6 which entitled him to a harmless error standard of review on
appeal.287 Avoidance through interpretation would allow more defen-
dants to challenge their sentences under harmless error review and would
foster the appearance of equitable treatment of comparable defendants.
The wide-ranging circuit split deserves resolution by the Supreme
Court. Different geographic areas are treating similar defendants differ-
ently-undermining not only the purposes of the Guidelines but also the
spirit of justice in the criminal punishment system. However, given the
fact that the Court has denied certiorari in almost half of the controlling
appellate circuit cases, including Gonzalez-Huerta,288 and the temporary
nature of Booker error, the possibility exists that the Court may simply
wait for the discrepancy to elapse. The discrepancy among the circuits
over Booker review presents an opportunity for the Court to add signifi-
cantly to the plain error review precedent and should not be foregone.
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280. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
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